"Von Zelewski's Last Stand"

The Battle of Lugalu - 17 August 1891 by Chris Dale © 2017 (www.germancolonialuniforms.co.uk)




Illustration from a French Magazine "Le Petit Journal" #45, October, 3 1891

Background to the Conflict

By 1890 the German armed force known as the Wissmanntruppe had completely defeated Abushiri's Arab Rebellion and thus largely brought peace to the coastal areas claimed as German East Africa. In May 1891 the Wissmanntruppe were designated the Kaiserliche Schutztruppe and von Wissmann retired from African military service leaving Emil von Zelewski as his successor.

The coastal trading routes were still not completely safe from attack by local tribesmen however, particularly in the South of the colony where raiders from warlike tribes such as the Ngoni Mafiti, the Wagogo and the Hehe picked at trading caravans.

The Hehe were in fact expanding their territory from their base near Iringa towards the German held coast. They had gone from being a small loosely based tribal grouping in the 1850s and expanded by conquest during the reign of Chief Munyigumbe. Under his son Chief Mkwawa (who came to throne in 1880), they had united over a hundred clans and became the dominant force in the area.

In the Summer of 1891 von Zelewski decided to resolve the situation with military force and organised an expeditionary force at Kilwa to march inland and confront the tribesmen.



Emil von Zelewski Photo from Frankfurt University Archive on <u>Wiki Commons</u>

The German Expeditionary Force

Emil von Zelewski was originally commissioned into the 99th Rhineland Infantry Regiment ("2. Oberrheinisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr.99") before being transferred to the German East Africa Company in 1886 and the Wissmanntruppe in 1889. He had successfully lead detachments of the Wissmanntruppe both separately and in conjunction with von Wissmann's columns in many actions during the Abushiri Rebellion. He was thus a very experienced commanding officer and was noted as a wise and cautious leader.

Von Zelewski's force originally consisted of four infantry companies, each of about 90 askaris commanded by a German officer and NCO. One company was turned back along the way, probably because of supply problems, leaving three to face the Hehe. In addition there was an artillery detachment also commanded by a German officer and NCOs, and possibly one or two machine guns (see Notes and Discrepancies below). The expedition took with them many supplies, foraged from the land and also herded their own cattle.

With the victories against Abushiri's rebels and smaller tribal conflicts behind them, the German askaris were an experienced force, well trained by African standards and with high morale. Up until this point the Germans had never come up against any serious resistance from inland tribes and a certain amount of over-confidence was probably in effect amongst their officers.



A Schutztruppe Field Company on the march in the early 20th Century
Photo by Walther Dobbertin from Frankfurt University Archive on Wiki Commons

ORGANISATION OF VON ZELEWSKI'S EXPEDITION 17th AUGUST 1891						
Unit	German Officers	German NCOs	African Personnel			
Command	Commandeur von Zelewski (†)					
Askari Infantry Compa	nnies					
5. Compagnie	Lieutenant von Zitzewitz (†)	Unteroffizier von Tiedewitz (†)	Sudanese Askaris			
6. Compagnie	Lieutenant von Tettenborn	Feldwebel Kay	Sudanese Askaris			
7. Compagnie	Lieutenant von Pirch (†)	Unteroffizier Schmidt (†) Büchsenmacher Hengelhaup (†)	Zulu Askaris			
Artillery Detachment						
3x c73 Field Guns or 1x c73 Field Gun and 2x Machine Guns (see Discrepancies below)	Lieutenant von Heydebreck	Unteroffizier Thiedemann (†) Unteroffizier Herrich (†) Unteroffizier Wutzer	Askari Gunners			
Medical Section						
	Arzt Dr. Buschow (†)	Lazarethgehülfe Hemprich	No mention has yet been found of Askari medics, stretcher bearers or assistants, yet it seems reasonable to assume some were detached for these duties.			
Supply Column						
170 African Porters 27 Donkeys (total in 20 Cows 60 Sheep and Goat	including those ridden by office	ers, pack animals and those pu	lling the artillery)			
Total	6 German Officers	8 German NCOs	3 Effendi (Askari Officers) -Murgan Effendi -Gaber Effendi -One unknown (†) 318 Askari NCOs and Other Ranks 170 Porters			

Uniforms, Equipment and Weapons of the German Expeditionary Force

German Schutztruppe Officers and NCOs Uniforms

The German officers and NCOs would have been wearing their khaki active service uniforms and white tropical helmets with khaki covers. New uniforms had been approved by the Colonial Office in Berlin for the East African Schutztruppe in June 1891. I think it doubtful however that the new uniforms had reached Kilwa by July 1891, when the expedition set off. Von Zelewski and his German officers and NCOs would therefore probably have still been wearing the old uniforms of the Wissmanntruppe (with their yellow metallic lace rank bars on the cuffs for officers). NCOs rank was displayed with yellow metallic lace chevrons on the upper left arm. Equipment would usually have been in the form of Sam Brown style belts in brown leather for officers and senior NCOs, with junior NCOs carrying an 1887 ammunition pouch one either side of the belt. Their backpacks, tents and personal possessions would mostly have been carried by porters but they would most likely have carried their own essentials such as water bottles and binoculars.

Askari Uniforms

I have so far found no photographs of the Zelewski Expedition but other photographs of the period indicate the style of the askari uniforms at this time. By 1891 all askaris would be wearing the khaki uniforms of the style originally used by the Sudanese in the Anglo-Egyptian army and adopted from them by the Wissmanntruppe and Schutztruppe. NCO rank insignia was worn in the form of red chevrons on the upper (or sometimes lower) left arm. Sudanese askaris usually wore the khaki tarbush with neckshade, and the Zulu askaris may have done the same or possibly still be wearing their red fezzes for active service. It seems from period photographs that neither company numbers nor imperial eagles as seen on later askari tarbushes were used at this stage. Puttees were worn in dark blue/grey with brown leather short boots. Equipment was also in brown leather with an 1887 ammunition pouch either side of a plain brass belt buckle. At the Battle of Lugalu the askaris presumably had little time to discard their full marching order (water bottle, bread bag, backpack and tent section- wrapped around the backpack or over the shoulder) before finding themselves in hand to hand combat.

Effendi Uniforms

Three African officers ("*Effendi*") were part of the expeditionary force. The Effendi wore the tarbush of the askari other ranks but with the khaki uniform of their German counterparts. Their rank was shown by one to three five pointed metal stars on the shoulder straps.

African Auxiliaries Appearance

The few African scouts that von Zelewski did deploy slightly ahead of the column would probably be warriors from neighbouring tribes, barely dressed not dissimilarly to the Hehe themselves. The 170 porters, herdsmen and servants of the Schutztruppe did not wear uniforms. Period photographs usually show them simply dressed with a loincloth or blanket wrapped around their bodies. They were often bareheaded and barefooted.

Weapons

The askaris were armed with the single shot Mauser Jägerbüchse 71 rifle and probably the S71 long bayonet. German junior NCOs would have been likewise armed. Officers and senior NCOs were armed with pistols, mostly likely the 1879 Reichsrevolver. Some may have carried privately purchased weapons. Swords were authorised for officers and NCOs, although were not always carried on active service. The Effendi were armed the same as German officers. African scouts may have carried their own weapons, including spears and possibly out-dated firearms. Porters were not armed.



Hehe Warriors in the early 20th Century.

Note the hide shields and facepaint or masks of the warriors in the foreground.

Photo by Walther Dobbertin from Frankfurt University Archive on Wiki Commons

The Hehe Army

The Hehe army at Lugalo consisted of around 3,000 warriors. A serving Schutztruppe officer, Ernst Nigmann later described the Hehe as possessing "an art of war developed to a level far superior to that of the other native peoples". They had indeed mastered battlefield tactics and their armies fought as regiments under clear structural commands following prepared plans as opposed to many African tribes who relied on solely on guerrilla strikes and disorganised charges.

Mpangire was the brother and second-in-command of the Hehe chief Mkwawa. He commanded the Hehe army at Lugalo. Like most of the Hehe army he had combat experience although only against rival tribes rather than a European organised army. Unlike many African tribes who were led into battle by their chiefs, the Hehe followed the European tactic of leaving their commander in the rear to direct actions.

Their previous victories over neighbouring tribes had given them combat experience and probably a sense of superiority in the area. Like many tribal armies their loyalty and bravery in battle was unquestionable. They were fighting to protect their homeland from a foreign invader.

I have found very few period photographs or illustrations of Hehe warriors. According to contemporary accounts the Hehe warriors were sparsely dressed. Some were naked others wore hide belts from which hide strips or animal pelts hung to cover their genitalia. A few wore long cloths wrapped around themselves, though these may have been discarded in battle. Such clothing became more common in the late 1890s. Wristbands and necklaces of beads have also been described. They sometimes wore headdresses consisting of feathers, coloured pom-poms or decorations of animal furs. The photograph below shows some of them with either white painted faces or masks

Hehe warriors were armed with almost mostly with spears (carrying up to six for throwing and a short spear with a long blade for stabbing). They carried long oval hide shields of the style made famous by the Zulu, with at least some regiments distinguished by their shield pattern (one elite regiment had only white hide shields). Some Hehe were also known to have carried short swords and axes around this period. They had limited numbers of muskets from the 1870s onwards but firearms were apparently not used to any decisive effect in the Battle at Lugalu.

The Battle of Lugalu

Start of the Campaign

The German expedition left Kilwa on 22nd July 1891 and travelled through Mafiti territory to Kisaki and onto Myombo (near Kilossa), reaching the Lugalu region by 16th August. So far, despite burning down several villages, they had met no serious resistance. They had often seen numbers of armed Wahehe en route, but these had always retreated as soon as shots were fired at them. This it seems, led von Zelewski into believing that his show of force would deter any conflict and force the Hehe into surrender.

Meanwhile Chief Mkwawa was well aware of the German troops coming his way. Reports had reached him early on of their formation and intentions. Scouting groups of his warriors then observed the force as they approached Uhehe territory reporting back on the column's movements and strength. An ambush was prepared for the German force near Lugalu.

The Battlefield


The battlefield is near the village of Lugalu, about 10 miles East of Iringa. It is just off the route of the modern A7 Tanzam Highway. There was a large ridge to the left of the intended route of von Zelewski's force, behind which the Hehe lay in wait. The ground sloped downwards further to their right. The terrain was covered in dry grass with thickets of dense bush and large rocks strewn about.



The dry Ruaha Riverbed not far from the battlefield, giving an idea of the terrain of the area.

Photo by Paul Shaffner on Wiki Commons

Timescale of Events during the Battle



The Battle of Lugalu 0700 HRS 17th August 1891

Notation by C Dale, Original Image from Google Earth

August 17th 0600 HRS

The expedition started off from just outside of Lugalu marching towards Kalenga. Despite being an experienced and reputedly cautious commander von Zelewski made the mistake of not sending scouts far up ahead and more particularly to his flanks to secure the route of the main force. They marched in the following marching order-

- -African Scouts with 10 Zulu Askaris of the 7. Compagnie
- -Commandeur von Zelewski and Arzt Dr. Buschow
- -Lieutenant von Pirch with the bulk of the 7. Compagnie including Unteroffizier Schmidt and Büchsenmacher Hengelhaupt
- -Artillery Detachment including Unteroffiziere Thiedemann, Herrich and Wutzer, then Lieutenant von Heydebreck
- -Lieutenant von Zitzewitz with the 5. Compagnie including Unteroffizier von Tiedewitz, Lazarethgehülfe Hemprich
- -Feldwebel Kay with 40 Sudanese Askaris of the 6. Compagnie
- -Porters and Luggage
- -Lieutenant von Tettenborn with another 20 Sudanese Askaris of the 6. Compagnie
- -Cattle, Sheep and Goats
- -The remaining 12 Sudanese Askaris of the 6. Compagnie

Meanwhile the Hehe had prepared an ambush at Lugalu. The warriors remained hidden from view behind a ridge to the left of the column's route. A Hehe lookout post was to fire a single musket shot as a signal to attack when the German column was in the ideal ambush position.

August 17th 0700 HRS

As the expeditionary force started its march below the ridge a German officer spotted a flock of birds and fired a shot at them hoping to bag some early morning hunting. This was mistaken by the Hehe army as the signal to attack while the column had not quite reached the arranged ambush position. Thousands of Hehe stormed over the ridge top and onto the German column below, screaming the war cry for which they had been named "*Hee Twahumite! He heeeeee!*".

Many, if not all of the askaris marched with unloaded rifles and barely had time to load let alone form up defensive squares before the Hehe were upon them. The design of the newly issued 1887 cartridge pouches was not familiar to the askaris and vital seconds were lost before they could open fire, even then only one or two volleys were fired.

There was no time to put the artillery into action. Chaos ensued, pack animals and porters fled. The artillery donkeys stampeded into the askaris of the 5. Compagnie. Many askaris also ran for their lives

August 17th 0715 HRS

The Hehe took as little as fifteen minutes to over-run the German column. Von Zelewski was killed on his donkey when he turned to one side to fire on one group of Hehe warriors only to be stabbed with a spear from the other side. Lieutenant von Pirch and Dr. Buschow were similarly cut down from their donkeys with fatal stab wounds. Most of the 7. Compagnie, Artillery Detachment, 5. Compagnie and advance party of the 6. Compagnie were slaughtered where they stood.

Lieutenant von Heydebreck, Unteroffizier Wutzer and Murgan Effendi with about 20 askaris managed to break away from the action and work their way up the slope to make a base there defending themselves against further Hehe attacks.

Only Lieutenant von Tettenborn's rear guard did not bear the full force of the Wahehe attack, probably saved only by the premature mistaken signal for action. Von Tettenborn, Feldwebel Kay and about 20 Sudanese askaris moved to the left of the main fighting and took up a circular defensive position further up the ridge, with unarmed porters and wounded in the centre. From here they flew a German flag from a tree and sounded the bugle call to rally any survivors and stragglers.

The Hehe by this point were chasing routed survivors and looting the expedition's supply column. Confusion was further spread by their setting fire to the dry grass.

August 17th 0830 HRS

Lieutenant von Heydebreck, Unteroffizier Wutzer and Murgan Effendi with about 12 askaris broke out of their position and joined up with von Tettenborn's defensive circle. Von Heydebreck was bleeding badly from two spear wounds behind his right ear. From these men von Tettenborn learned that the majority of the column had been destroyed and the artillery captured.



Schutztruppe Askaris formed into a defensive square during training in the early 20th Century.

August 17th 0900 HRS

Unteroffizier Thiedemann, with severe spear and burn wounds was brought into Lieutenant von Tettenborn's camp by a patrol of askaris. The burning grass was now threatening von Tettenborn and his survivors' position.

August 17th 1600 HRS

By now Lieutenant von Tettenborn had gathered as many survivors and wounded as possible and recovered some of the column's luggage. The still menacing Hehe along with the grass fires made it impossible to search for more survivors and many of the wounded probably burned to death. Von Tettenborn decided to begin the retreat before he was cut off from doing so by the Hehe.

August 17th Nightfall

Lieutenant von Tettenborn's group camped that night next to a river some way past their previous night's encampment. His group now consisted only of himself and Lieutenant von Heydebreck, 3 German NCOs (although Unteroffizier Thiedemann died of his wounds later on the journey), 2 Askari Officers, 62 Askari NCOs and other ranks, 74 porters and 7 donkeys.

From there they marched back, mostly by night to avoid further Hehe attacks, and reached Myombo on 29 August 1891.

German Casualties and Conclusions

For the Germans who had lost their commander and a quarter of the colony's armed force in one day it was a devastating blow. It was another three years before another German expedition under Oberst Freiherr von Schelle was able to decisively beat the Hehe at Kalenga in 1894. A memorial obelisk was later built to von Zelewski's expedition near the site of the 1891 battle, it is on the South side of the modern Tanzam A7 road on the approach to Lugalu from the direction of Mahenge.

German Casualties	German Officers	German NCOs	Askari Officers	Askari NCOs and Other Ranks	African Porters
Troop Total	6	8	3	318	170
Killed or Missing in Action	4	6	1	256	96
Survivors	2	2	2	62	74
Wounded Among The Survivors	1	-	-	11	7

Hehe Casualties and Conclusions

There are no accurate figures as to the losses of the Hehe army. Estimates vary from as few as 260 to as many as 1,000 (see Notes and Discrepancies below). They had however won a complete victory, one of those rare moments in colonial history such as Isandlwana or Little Big Horn where a tribal army inflicted a complete defeat over a better armed colonial one. It was indeed the biggest defeat and single day's loss in German colonial history.

The Hehe army was not in a position to follow up its victory with further strikes at large German forces though. Instead, they continued to harass trading caravans and fight small actions against the Schutztruppe for the next three years until defeated at their fortified capital at Kalenga in 1894. The rebellion was largely finished there. Mkwawa and a small band of followers continued guerrilla resistance until his final entrapment and suicide in 1898.

The Wahehe then became loyal to German rule on even during the Maji-Maji rebellion, when they offered their warriors to fight alongside the Schutztruppe. During the First World War when British and South African troops eventually pushed the Schutztruppe towards Iringa the warriors of the Wahehe finally turned on the Germans again.

In a bizarre and gruesome twist to the tale, the Schutztruppe had removed Chief Mkwawa's head after his suicide and taken it as proof of his death. The skull was later taken back to Germany. As repayment for the assistance in the First World War, the British demanded Mkwawa's skull back on behalf of the Wahehe in the Treaty of Versailles (Article 246). It was eventually belatedly returned by the West German government in 1954. It is now in the Mkwawa Memorial Museum in Kalenga, Tanzania.



The Skull of Chief Mkwawa

Photo by Matt Crypto at the Mkwawa Memorial Museum, Kalenga on Wiki Commons


Another memorial was later built to the victorious Hehe who died in the Battle of Lugalu. It is on the North side of the modern Tanzam A7 road on the approach to Lugalu from the direction of Mahenge.


Notes and Discrepancies

The books and websites I have used as source material for this article do not always agree on many details of the battle and the forces involved. This is not surprising as probably less than ten literate eyewitnesses survived the day.

For the most part I have gone with von Tettenborn and Nigmann's figures, especially for the German side of events. Maximilian von Tettenborn was of only two surviving German officers and eyewitnesses to the battle. Ernst Nigmann was a serving Schutztruppe officer with personal experience of the Wahehe, who less than twenty years after the battle was commissioned to write a full and detailed official history of the East African Schutztruppe. For his sources he had full access to original documentation, including von Tettenborn's account and also was able to interview other serving officers and veterans. That is not to say he is always correct.

Where sources have disagreed on major issues, I have noted them below.





Nigmann's Map of the Battlefield

Illustration from "Geschichte der kaiserlichen Schutztruppe für Deutsche-Ostafrika"

This is the map that originally appeared in Ernst Nigmann's 1912 book "Geschichte der kaiserlichen Schutztruppe fur Deutsche-Ostafrika". Note that the Memorial (marked "C") and the hill with the Hehe army waiting in ambush are in similar positions to the Google Earth photograph above. What is very different is that Nigmann has von Zelewski's column being attacked from their left while marching to the East, away from Karenga (although he marks it as towards Kuirenga). This must be a simple cartographical mistake, all accounts (German and African) agree that he was marching towards Mkwawa's stronghold when he was ambushed. In which case he would have been marching West and if the location is correct, attacked from the right. Tettenborn does not specify from which side the attack began.

2. The Opening Shot

Nigmann says that the unnamed German who inadvertently sprung the ambush was firing at an eagle. Mkwawa.com says it was at a flock of Guinea fowl. Both types of birds can be found in East Africa. Tettenborn says it was a signal shot but does not mention who fired it or if it was at any birds at all

3. Strength of the German Force

I have quoted Nigmann for the organisation and strength of the German expeditionary force, although within his own text there is some ambiguity and it is possible he made a mistake. Nigmann says the force consisted of 362 askaris, whereas most other sources describe about 320 askaris. Nigmann's total askari casualties and survivors do not then add up. When totalling the dead, wounded, missing and surviving askaris in Nigmann's book it seems the original number would have to have been 318. Nigmann and von Tettenborn agree on the organisation of the force with three companies of askaris. Peers is alone in asserting that there were five.

4. Organisation of the German Force

I have seen no clear table listing the organisation and deployment of officers in the German force. I have compiled the organisational table above from comparing Nigmann and von Tettenborn's accounts and inferring which officers commanded which units from where they were in the order of march. Both accounts agree that the column marched with the 7. Compagnie first, followed by the 5. and 6.. Nigmann says one company was made up of Zulu Askaris, two of Sudanese but does not say which. Von Tettenborn says the Zulus were at the front (so presumably would have been the 7. Compagnie) leaving the 5. and 6. which would have to be Sudanese.

5. German Artillery and Machine Guns

Nigmann initially says the expedition had one artillery piece and two machine guns. Later he says they had three guns, perhaps counting the artillery and machine guns together. Von Tettenborn does not mention any machine guns but refers to three artillery pieces ("Geschütze") being captured by the Hehe. Peers relates that the Germans did manage to get one of their machine guns into action, though this is not corroborated by von Tettenhorn.

6. Strength of the Hehe Army

Nigmann estimates the Hehe strength at between 3,000 and 5,000, most other sources including von Tettenborn, Beck and Peers, stick to the lower end of that scale at around 3,000.

7. Hehe casualties

Mkwawa.com says up to a thousand Hehe were killed in the battle, Peers and Beck figure it as low as 260. Von Tettenborn estimated the number at 700 including several chiefs. He mistakenly included Chief Mkwawa among those reported dead.

8. Leaving the Battlefield

Nigmann reports that von Tettenborn as his band of survivors remained on the battle field searching for survivors until the next day, August 18th. Peers says he stayed two days. Von Tettenborn own account says that he left about 1600HRS on the day of the battle as he feared the Hehe would cut off his chances of retreat if he stayed any longer.

9. "Hehe", "Wahehe" and "Uhehe"

The word Wahehe is often used in the same context as Hehe. Hehe is the name of the people and their Bantu language. It was allegedly based on their war cry of "Hee Twahumite, Hee Twahumite! He, he, he, heeeeee" (or "Hey, we have come out! Hey, hey, hey, hey!")" and was used by their enemies (including the Germans) to describe them. The Hehe then adopted the name from their neighbours. Strictly speaking Wahehe, with the prefix "Wa-", is the group collective term. With the prefix "U-", as in Uhehe it describes their land. All personal names are prefixed by "M-" as in Mkwawa and Mpangire in Hehe Bantu.

10. English and German Spellings of African Place Names

Various spellings are used in different sources. Local African place names have been spelled in various ways over the years by German and later British officials. Most commonly Lugalu or Lugalo is spelled Rugaro in German, and Kalenga called Kuirenga.

11. French Reporting of the Battle

The illustration on the fornt page of this article is from a French magazine, "Le Petit Journal" #45, 3 October 1891, kindly scanned by Arne Schöfert of Traditionsverband. I have included it on this page as a curiosity. The Illustrator clearly had no real information as to the appearance or uniforms of the Schutztruppe and Hehe and has simply made educated guesses. The same goes for the journalism which is typical of the era yet sounds to the modern reader more like blatant anti-Germany propaganda than a serious news piece.

"Destruction of a German Expedition in Africa. The Germans went decidedly too fast and cooked themselves, as recent events in Africa have shown. After having assurance of their unity in Europe, they believe themselves to be masters of the World. They imagine that they are sufficient to terrify the earth. Vanity of vanities! A group of negroes was sufficient to ruin their prestige in Africa. The Germans had a need for colonies to sell their industrial products which due to their imperfections are not suitable for civilised nations. Then they have so many new births that they cannot survive because of the poverty of the country, augmented by the poverty caused by war. In these conditions they sent an expedition to East Africa commanded by Captain Zelewski, he first arrived in this conquered country with typical Teutonic insolence and barbarity. The Wahehe tribe saw this as the wrong way to act and have massacred large numbers of the invaders. The astonishment was great in Germany, as you know, the negroes! This may give a pause for some time- the Prussians have no chance anywhere. This is the start of a bad series of events for them."

tré du Petit Journal

Destruction d'une expédition allemande en Afrique

Les Allemands veulent décidément aller trop vite, et il leur en cuit parfois. Les derniers événements survenus en Afrique viennent de le prouver.

Après avoir assuré leur unité en Europe, ils se sont crus les maîtres du monde, ils ont imaginé qu'il leur suffisait de se montrer pour terrifier la terre.

Vanité des vanités! Une poignée de nègres

a suffi à ruiner pour longtemps leur prestige

en Afrique.

Les Allemands ont besoin de colonies pour écouler leurs produits industriels si imparfaits que les nations civilisées n'en veulent plus, puis il faut qu'ils casent les malheureux qui naissent en si grand nombre chez eux et n'y

peuvent vivre à cause de la pauvreté du pays, pauvreté si augmentée par les frais de guerre trop lourds pour nos vainqueurs.

Dans ces conditions ils ont envoyé dans l'Afrique orientale une expédition commandée par le capitaine Zelewski, lequel s'est conduit tout d'abord comme en pays conquis, avec une insolence et une barbarie vraiment tudesques.

Les nègres ont mal pris cette façon d'agir, et les tribus Wahehes l'ont prouvé à Ilenza en massacrant copieusement les envahisseurs.

La stupeur a été grande en Allemagne; songez donc, des nègres!

Quoi qu'il en soit, cela peut donner à réfléchir; depuis quelque temps les Prussiens n'ont de chance nulle part. C'est une série mauvaise qui commence pour eux.

Sources and Further Reading

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"Warrior Peoples of East Africa 1840-1900" by Chris Peers (published by Osprey Men-at-Arms)

"Colonial Armies: Africa 1850 to 1918" by Peter Abbott (Published by Foundry)

"Across Africa" by Verney Lovett Cameron (published by Ripping Yarns)

"The Colonial Wars of Imperial Germany" by Paul Beck (on the Savage and Soldier website)

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Wikipedia page on the Hehe based on the following books-

"Eine Kopfjagt" by Martin Baer and Olaf Schöter

"Raising the Flag of War" by Andreus Bauer

"Schutztruppe Deutsch Ostafrika" by Holger Doebold

"A Modern History of Tanganyika" by John Iliffe

"The Wahehe" by Alison Remayne

"Die Wahehe" by Ernst Nigmann

"Gegen Araber und Wahehe" by Tom von Prince

"Le Petit Journal" #45, 3 October 1891

Wikipedia - Gefecht bei Lula-Rugaro

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